Note, that this is a response after a lot of discussion had taken place in such a way that I felt necessary to interject. Some references here might not be very enlightening in the absence of context. The post can, of course, be viewed in its context.

Well, I am glad that I didn't post on the topic a while ago. It seems that it has gone straight to hell the minute it was born, as I suspected.

To be honest, the claims made in this thread are appallingly absurd. Let's take the Gremlin-example, which is indeed neither coherent nor pragmatic. Coherent it might be if we assume Klaatu to be extremely ignorant of almost everything, so he doesn't have a conflicting statement that he considers true. Pragmatic it doesn't seem to be in any case.

You might.

Okay, let us assume this.

In what sense? What pragmatic value has this Gremlin to you that you wouldn't have without the Gremlin? If the default position is that you press the "on" button, and the computer starts running, but you have no theory beyond this, what then would this Gremlin bring to you in the sense of pragmatism? Does it help you to fix your computer when it doesn't start? Makes you a better Quake-player? What? As such, I can see absolutely NO pragmatic value whatsoever to this Gremlin of yours - so why is it as an example of a pragmatic truth?

What are these other beliefs you have? You assume that you can simply step outside the whole world around you and start living in a world of fairytales. Have you seen a Gremlin? Have you ever heard a computer expert tell you that it is actually electricity, not Gremlins? You would have to abandon electronics for your Gremlins, which would probably cause you to abandon physics. Would you do that? Is THAT pragmatic? Is it coherent? What about taking the plug off the computer - how does that affect the Gremlin? What about me tearing your computer apart showing that no Gremlin exists? Aren't those incoherent with your claim? You can only keep the coherence if you drop all the propositions that are incoherent with this example, and I am sure that would mean a whole lot of propositions. This would actually have a severe effect on your ability to function in the society.

It is common to most arguments against pragmatic coherence theory that they have practically nothing to do with either pragmatism or coherence. The naive counter-argument is to take some seemingly useful (mostly something that is just not-harmful) argument and then assume a context where this would be coherent (failing to consider what must be dropped in order to maintain this coherence), and then claim that the coherent pragmatic theorist is absurd.

Now THAT'S absurd!

Sorry to say, but it is you who is incredibly perverse ;).

I don't think it is fair at all. I find it very hard to picture something that is absurd yet useful. Perhaps you have something like string theory in mind - or quantum physics? wink

Now this is another odd thing. You seem to assume that the person who is an advocate of C/P is a completely idiot all the sudden. That he might consider scientific method somehow unpragmatic? There isn't much things that are more pragmatic than science. Of course, the first thing you would do is to look inside - and there is your incoherence and unpragmatism.

That is exactly why correspondence theory is called a metaphysical theory of truth, whereas coherence theory is an epistemological theory of truth. Just because you have an axiomatic belief that truth must be understood in the metaphysical sense it doesn't follow that it is wrong to think of it in epistemological terms.

However, the most important thing to understand here is that coherence pragmatic theory of truth has BOTH. The pragmatism is actually an attempt of synthesis between metaphysical and epistemological theories of truth. Assume, for the sake of peace of mind, if you will, that what is pragmatic should eventually get close to what is the metaphysical truth - because it would be hard to assume in the long run that something would work, yet be completely off.

Now to the actual matter.

This does by the way make it a bit idealistic in nature. That is in the sense that often it is considered idealism to say that we have no access to the "real world". Transcendental idealism, Skeptical or Empirical idealism, you name it. This is, however, more like epistemological idealism than metaphysical. At least in the case of Kant, who was an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist.

Actually, I think this is something that should be done in the first place anyway. We can't just construct a theory out of nowhere - we must define what we mean by God, and that is ultimately based on what we want to achieve. That is, basically, because what the theory will prove or prove wrong is that special instance of God.

I am not sure what the problem is here, ultimately. What I seem to be left wanting is a definition of God. Should it be the bearded nice man on a cloud, perhaps an impersonal force behind it all, or maybe even a construct of human mind? I think the first one is incoherent with science (which is why it is not very popular), the second one is coherent, but I don't see much pragmatic value to it as such. The third one is interesting, because it is both coherent and pragmatic: pragmatism comes from the usefulness of the concept of God as bringer of hope etc (of course, it can bring wars etc, but the important part is that it has an effect on things to begin with - then we can consider whether it is actually useful, and under what circumstances etc).

I think that coherentic pragmatic theory of truth does seem to lead to theism (In a rather peculiar way, however, not in the traditional sense.) It depends on many factors (such as how the person uses faith), however, so I am not sure. But assuming a God is very useful in many senses - one has hope, a direction in life, someone to talk one's worries to (through prayer), someone to soothe the sad mind etc. It can have negative effects like fundamentalism often does, though. In those cases it might be better that the person wouldn't believe in God. But the question of God is a legitimate one in C/P. It is actually far more legitimate in that than in correspondence theory of truth, where it is often omitted as a meaningless or hopeless question - in C/P no question is really that, except when it lacks syntax or semantics.

The point is, simply: it doesn't matter what the use of God is per se. As long as we cannot know things in the correspondence sense, it doesn't matter whether he exists in that sense or not. What matters is what the impact of his supposed existence or inexistence is, and what properties we attach to God. These properties define whether his existence is coherentic and/or pragmatic. And in what sense.

In general, I find it rather disturbing that so often people ask "does God exist?" without ever stopping to ask what "God" means - there is probably nothing of which there is more different opinions than this!